In 1951 the Genocide Convention pledged to abolish all cruel and unfair forms of torture and death to innocent civilians for religious, national and ethnic reasons. 67 years after its ratifi cation, we seem to be witnessing more international criminal trials for crimes against humanity than ever before. Th e recent alarming rise in such cases calls into question the morality and punishment of genocide. What impact does the Genocide Convention still have in today's challenging international climate? Is the crime of genocide simply too complex and too 'evil' to punish appropriately? Th is article provides an in-depth examination of the off ence of genocide, and an analysis of the jurisprudential issues relating to the punishment of genocide. Is it possible to punish genocide appropriately?
Introduction
International criminal law has progressed in leaps and bounds over the last seven decades. Th e international community is no longer afraid to exert pressure on wayward rulers and their unethical customs. But in the midst of all the developments, the Genocide Convention remains obscure. Close examination of the 1951 Convention reveals a surprisingly ambiguous off ence, regulatory in nature and almost impossible to fairly apply. Th e Courts and Tribunals which have jurisdiction over genocide have had to canvass the vague wording of the provisions for themselves. Th is lack of clarity leads to a frustrating reliance on the next available off ence: crimes against humanity. Th is dilemma not only releases the perpetrator from the moral stigma attached to genocide, but includes a risk of humanity crimes becoming the popular 'catch-all category' in international law. In the rare event that an oppressor's behaviour does fall into the provisions of genocide, the mode of punishment (i.e., imprisonment) seems insignifi cant compared to the horrors of the crime. Aside from regulatory issues, it becomes clear during analysis that genocide is also an off ence based on morality. How do we punish a moral wrong? Genocidal acts continue to be committed despite the introduction of the Convention, 1 and recent case law has done very little to reinforce the grave nature of genocide or to close the regulatory loopholes that appear in the provisions. What are the theoretical approaches to punishment, and which ones are applicable to genocide?
Th e Development of Genocide in International Criminal Law
'Genocide' loosely signifi es an act committed with the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. Many defi nitions of genocide exist, including the following by Chalk and Jonassohn : "genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group."
2 Th e word itself was thought up by Dr. Raphael Lemkin (1900 Lemkin ( -1959 in his work Axis Rule in Occupied Europe : 'genocide' comes from the ancient Greek word 'genos' (tribe, race) and the Latin term 'cide' (killing). 3 Th e idea that individuals can be personally liable for international crimes was slow to develop. Lemkin proposed an off ence of barbarity in 1933. 4 Th is included acts of economic extermination and brutal attacks on the dignity of individuals causing damage to the collectivity to which they belonged. Lemkin's groundbreaking legislation proposed: 1) the punishment of acts aimed at destroying the life, bodily integrity, liberty, dignity and the economic existence of a racial, religious or social collectivity; 2) both instigators and accomplices to acts of barbarity carry the same punishment as the author; and 3) all perpetrators were to be prosecuted and punished independently of the place where the act was committed. Th is was keeping in line with the principle forum loci deprehensionis or 'universal 1) For example: the Korean war, the intertribal Burundi killings between the Tutsi and Hutu groups, the reported massacre of Ugandans during the rule of former President Idi Amin, the slaying of dissidents in Equatorial Africa after independence was secured from Spain in 1968, the killing of Cambodians during the reign of Pol Pot, the mass killings of members of the Muslim minority in Chad repression', based on the principle that an off ender can be brought to justice in the place where he is apprehended because he is regarded as an enemy of the whole international community. 5 Lemkin's work was taken very seriously at the end of World War II.
Th e International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo were ad hoc bodies set up to deal with the aftermath of the Second World War. Th e provisions of the Nuremberg Charter were affi rmed by the General Assembly in 1946 in Resolution 95(1).
6 Th e International Law Commission (ILC) formulated the following crimes under international criminal law:
Principle 6: Th e crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law: a) crimes against peace; b) war crimes; c) crimes against humanity.
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At this point, genocide was still embedded within 'crimes against humanity', but the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 96(I) of 13 December 1946 requested that the Economic and Social Council draft a convention. In December 1948, the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
8 Th e Convention came into force on January 12, 1951, and by 1985 there were 96 ratifi cations. Th e Convention affi rms the criminality of genocide in time of peace as well as in time of war (Article 1), distinguishing it from war crimes into a category of its own. Article 2 defi nes the off ence:
Article 2: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 5) Taken from Articles 1, 6 and 7 of Lemkin's proposed legislation to the 5th Conference for the Unifi cation of Penal Law, documented in Lemkin, R. (1933 c) deliberately infl icting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Persons committing conspiracy, incitement, attempt and complicity to genocide are also punishable, whether they are constitutional rulers, public offi cials, or private individuals (Articles 3 and 4). Article 5 states that the parties to the Convention are under an obligation to enact the necessary domestic legislation to give eff ect to the Convention and to provide eff ective penalties. 9 Article 5 keeps in line with Lemkin's forum loci deprehensionis or 'universal repression' idea, which he describes as 'the symbol and practical application of the higher doctrine of moral and legal solidarity' in his 1947 work. 
Th e Crime of Genocide in Detail
Because the Genocide Convention has been adopted into customary inter national criminal law, the Convention has its own actus reus and mens rea . International criminal responsibility is a diffi cult concept. Can a State carry a legal intent? It seems appropriate to genocide to separate the culpable individuals from the State and then instigate international proceedings against the individuals.
11 A breakdown of genocide follows below, which allows us to identify the punishable elements of the off ence.
Th e Actus Reus of Genocide
Article 2 of the Convention clearly defi nes the conduct that may amount to genocide: a) killing members of a national or ethical, racial or religious group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) deliberately infl icting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent birth within the group; e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Akayesu
12 tightly defi ned the above list: a) killing is 'murder'; b) serious bodily and mental harm should not necessarily be permanent or irremediable; c) conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction include subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, 13 systematic expulsion from homes, and the reduction of essential medical services below minimum requirements; d) measures intended to prevent births within the group consist of sexual mutilation, sterilization, forced birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages; e) forcibly transferring children can include physical and mental measures.
14 On fi rst impressions this is an impressive and all-encompassing defi nition: one can not imagine an individual instigating an off ence above and beyond those listed. But each case of genocide is individual to the perpetrator, making each act of genocide completely unique from all other acts of genocide. Fitting such distinctive fantasies into a general defi nition is diffi cult.
How are each of the four 'groups' (national, ethnical, racial, religious) under the Convention defi ned? Th e ICTR and the ICTY have intervened on these points. In Akayesu 15 the Trial Chamber of the ICTR set out a defi nition of each group. 'National groups' are a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond of common citizenship coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties. An 'ethnic group' is a group whose members share a common language or culture, a 'racial group' is a group based on the hereditary physical traits often identifi ed with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors, and a 'religious group' is a group whose members share the same religion, denomination or mode of worship. Whilst this list appears to incorporate every conceivable type of group, it was thought by the ICTR that the groups protected against genocide should not be limited to the four groups envisaged in the provisions but should include 'any stable and permanent group'. 16 Th is would be logical, as it would take into account both minority groups and the rather large category of 'political' groups which does not seem to have been considered. Professor Cassese -who used to sit as a judge in the ICTY -remains unconvinced, and controversially believes that the framers of the Convention explicitly intended only the four groups mentioned to be protected. 17 Victims must be chosen by reason of their membership in the group whose destruction was sought. Th e current case law tells us that what matters is the intent to attack victims on account of their ethnic, racial, or religious characteristics. Th is is, however, diffi cult to prove and easy to deny. As a result of Krstic and Zoran Kupreskic it must currently be established that: (i) the victims were in fact treated as belonging to one of the protected groups; and (ii) they considered themselves as belonging to one of such groups. 18 Can we take from this that the test for 'groups' is both objective (the victim's view) and subjective (the perpetrator's view)? A further mixture of objectivity and subjectivity appeared in Kayishema and Ruzindana where 'self-identification' and 'identifi cation by others' were considered to be key factors when identifying an ethnic group.
19 Rutaganda pushed the subjective standard even further by suggesting that for the purposes of applying the Genocide Convention, membership of a group is a completely subjective concept.
20 Th e ICTY Trial Chambers applied this strictly subjective approach in Jelisic 21 and Krstic.
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Akhavan strongly condemns this approach, claiming that whilst a constructivist approach to identity is appealing, this solely subjective test leads to a theoretical absurdity: a perpetrator could defi ne virtually any group as ethnic, irrespective of its objective attributes, and be guilty of genocide. 23 Should not a fair and liberal criminal system take an objective view? Rutaganda was quick to defi ne its defi nition of the subjective test, concluding that certain groups -such as political and economic groups -were excluded from the Convention defi nition because of their 'mobile' status, suggesting that the Convention intended to cover relatively stable and permanent groups. 24 Th is is disappointing. Did the United Nations when drafting the Genocide Convention intend to turn a blind eye to political victims? Most mass killings take place during political upheavals. Th is would allow President Robert Mugabe to slip through a loophole in the Convention, as his Zanu-PF party no doubt acted on political motives. Adolf Hitler also harboured political reasons for exterminating over one million people. Would he be able to escape liability under the Genocide Convention too? the purposes of the 1951 Convention as the result of offi cial documents labelling them as such. For further discussion see P. Akhavan , (2005) 'In whole or in part' is a very vague element of the actus reus of genocide. Th e 'part' of the group which is exterminated must represent a large number relative to the whole size of the group and the destruction must target a qualitatively signifi cant part of the group i.e. the elite part of the group. 25 Krstic held that the perpetrator must view the part of the group they wish to destroy as a distinct entity.
26 Geographic location will not indicate whether the targeted group is 'substantial', but it can, in combination with other factors, inform the analysis. 27 Th is all seems a little vague, but is likely to develop on an ad hoc basis on individual merits.
Th e Mens Rea of Genocide
Th e mens rea for genocide is provided very clearly in Article 2 of the Convention, which is the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Jorgic described the visions of such a perpetrator: " [they] do not see the victim as a human being, but only as a member of the persecuted group." 28 Interestingly, Shaw notes that States may deny genocide by claiming that the intent to destroy a group in whole or in part was in fact absent. 29 In such a scenario, Akayesu held that intention is almost impossible to determine, and so in the absence of a confession from the accused, his intent can be inferred from a certain number of presumptions of fact. 30 What evidence would be required for this? Th e ICTY in Krstic considered evidence relating to the cultural or social destruction of a group in relation to implying intention. Despite only physical and biological destruction of a group coming within the ambit of the Convention, the ICTY held that simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group may be considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group. 31 Th is practice by the ICTY seems to be a long stretch to establish a mens rea for genocide, as logically, the destruction of religious symbols can simply mean just that. However, attacks on religious symbols may be coupled with physical or biological destruction, and these widespread symbolic attacks may take a more evidential standpoint when coupled with witness accounts in future cases to aid the verifi cation of the required mens rea .
'Ethnic cleansing' -where a certain group of people are 'weeded out' of the larger race -is not in itself provided for under Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, 32 and the ICTY has refused to label ethnic cleansing as genocide.
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Vuckovic recently confi rmed that 'the forced expulsion of a population with an acceptance that a consequence may be death' does not characterise the intent to destroy an ethnic group in whole or in part. 34 Is this is a wise decision? In similar cases, 'ethnic cleansing' has been characterised as genocide. For example, Judge Riad in Karadzic and Mladic held that ethnic cleansing can lead to new borders 'by violently changing the national or religious composition of the population, therefore presenting genocidal characteristics.' 35 Could this rationale pave the way to a new off ence of cultural genocide in the future? In Krstic , Bosnian Serb forces killed all military-aged men, thus eliminating all likelihood that they could ever re-establish themselves on that territory. Th e physical disappearance of the group did not amount to a 'physical destruction' of the group under the Convention, but the ICTY held that the group had been 'destroyed'. 36 Did the Chamber fl irt with the notion of cultural genocide by treating the combination of the massacres and their forcible transfer as the 'destruction' of the group? 37 It must be noted that Lemkin did not limit genocide to physical destruction but suggested many forms of genocide, including political, social, cultural, language, national feeling, religious, economic, personal security, liberty, health, and dignity. If the Convention covered all acts of murder motivated by discrimination, surely this would send a message to world leaders that their unlawful behaviour is in no uncertain terms to be categorised as genocide? 38 Either way, 'ethnic cleansing' is currently only an act from which genocidal intent can be inferred. Whereas both genocide and crimes against humanity require the intent to commit the actus reus , genocide also requires a special intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group. Otherwise known as dolus specialis, this is a unique mental element to genocide. 39 In addition, there can be no reckless genocide.
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Dolus specialis applies to all acts of genocide under Article 2 of the Convention. Th is special intent requires the perpetrator to 'clearly intend the result', signifying 'a psychological nexus between the physical result and the mental state of the perpetrator'. 41 In Jorgic , the dolus specialis was deduced from the circumstances of an attack carried out through the structurally organized control of a group, of which the perpetrator was 'aware'. 42 'Awareness' appears to play an important part in establishing the dolus specialis of genocide. Akayesu may have confused this aggravated intent with recklessness, as the Trial Chamber held in that case that the off ender was culpable because he knew or should have known that the act committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a group. 43 International criminal law must be careful not to include recklessness into the Genocide Convention defi nition, as this would soften the evil element which distinguishes genocide from all other crimes. At the other end of the spectrum, a perhaps too lenient judgement can be found in Jelisic, where the defendant could not be found guilty of genocide because he killed 'arbitrarily': it had not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused was motivated by the dolus specialis of the crime. 44 Jelisic can be accused of narrowing the law. If evidence is found that links the perpetrator's intent to destroy a group to the actual destruction of that group, can it not then be assumed that the dolus specialis is made out? What other evidence would be required short of a confession? Perhaps Jorgic is a better alternative, where systematic expulsion can be an indication of the required intent?
Punishing a Moral Wrong: Th eory
Looking back at Lemkin's work before the Genocide Convention came into being, it becomes very clear that the off ence of genocide is based on morality.
should be read with caution. Th is wide-ranging off ence could do more harm than good. For further criticism see C. Tournaye, ibid., at page 5. 39) Kayishema Lemkin believed that by violating the natural right of existence, genocide is not only a crime against the rules of war, but a crime against humanity. 45 He submitted that the practice of genocide anywhere in the world curtails the vital interests of all civilised people: "Minorities of one sort or another exist in all countries, and if persecution of any minority by any country is tolerated anywhere, then the very moral and legal foundations of constitutional government may be shaken." 46 Morality strikes at the very heart of genocide, but punishing a moral wrong has jurisprudential diffi culties. Genocide is considered to be a 'peremptory norm' or 'jus cogens' , which is a fundamental legal obligation owed by States to all others ( erga omnes ). 47 Gardiner asserts that jus cogens are rules that are 'blindingly obvious' and are 'clearly a part of international law'. 48 A good example of the nature of jus cogens is provided in the Nicaragua case, 49 which described the prohibition of the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations to be: "A 'universal norm', a 'universal international law', a 'universally recognized principle of international law', and a 'principle of jus cogens'." 50 Considering the moral signifi cance of the individual when making political assessments is one of the main features of liberalism, endorsed by Dworkin , 51 Rawls , 52 and Nozick . 53 Th is approach allows civilians to be taken seriously as moral agents worthy of respect and appears in many diff erent guises: Dworkin wrote of equal respect and concern, 54 Hart wrote of a principle of fairness, 55 and the utilitarian theory believes that each person should count for one and no more than one.
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Utilitarianism is concerned with the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. Th e threat of punishment is believed to have a deterrent eff ect on potential off enders, and the negative eff ect of punishment is outweighed by the saving of pain and increased happiness amongst the secure public. 57 In direct contrast to utilitarianism, it is also thought that there is a need to infl ict an unpleasant punishment upon a culpable off ender for the simple reason that they 'deserve it'. Th is is the classical retributivist view, typically found in the guise of the 'desert principle' in the work of Kant .
58 Th is school of thought dates back to the lex talionis : an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, etc, except the retributivist view also takes into account the knowledge and capacity of the defendant to control his or her actions: the off ender must be culpable, and not simply an innocent man in the wrong place at the wrong time or sacrifi ced for the 'greater good'. Both deterrence theorists and retributivists believe that it is morally just to infl ict punishment upon off enders. What separates the two positions is how they go about justifying the punishment.
Utilitarianism, Deterrence and Genocide
A common criticism directed towards the utilitarian approach to punishment is that individuals are treated as 'a means to an ends' as opposed to 'ends in themselves' 59 and are sacrifi ced merely to achieve a general social goal with no consideration as to the eff ect of the punishment on the incapacitated individual:
"Th is cost/benefi t approach to the justifi cation of punishment is at the same time the theory's greatest strength and its greatest weakness. It is the former because it is such an eminently sensible and intuitively compelling rationale. We punish in order to keep the levels of crime to a reasonable minimum. It is as simple as that. It is the latter, a great weakness, for on these terms the duty or right to punish an off ender is straightforwardly contingent on how much good the punishment will do. It is easy to conjure up hypothetical cases in which deterrence theory would require punishing the innocent, excessively, punishing." the state? Or, will the 'greater good' he was trying to achieve be recognised and will he be free to go? Sprigge applies the utilitarian theory directly to a scenario of war:
"… it is within the bounds of possibility that a commander whose chances of victory demanded some sort of co-operation from the local people, and who had good reason to believe that without this victory the common good of humanity would suff er, fi nding this method of securing the population's co-operation the only workable one, would rightly consider that it was justifi ed. If the circumstances really were as described most people who condone war at all would probably think the act was right."
61 Th e outcome of this argument is disturbing. Most genocidal leaders indeed have a political or religious justifi cation for their acts. Hitler believed that the extermination of the Jewish population would allow the larger Arian race to fl ourish. Off enders could argue: "the best interests of the majority were at heart … it was a decision taken for the good of the people." Could the application of the utilitarianism theory of punishment to the act of genocide eff ectively abolish the crime of genocide?
Retributivism and Genocide
Genocide is a crime against morality. Described as the 'crime of crimes' by Kambanda, 62 a feeling of 'just deserts' usually springs to mind when one thinks of punishing genocide. Would it be appropriate to save from punishment the state leader who abused his power to kill many innocent civilians? Kant makes himself very clear: it is a matter of justice that the off ender must be punished: "… the right to pardon a criminal … is certainly the most slippery of all the rights of the sovereign. With respect to a crime of one subject against another, he absolutely cannot exercise this right, for in such cases exemption from punishment constitutes the greatest injustice toward his subjects. If legal justice perishes, then it is no longer worthwhile for men to remain alive on this earth." 63 If international criminal law was to take the retributivist view when punishing genocide, two questions would inevitably arise: 1) how is the unit of punishment to be measured; and 2) what is the justifi cation for the punishment? Why hang or shoot an off ender because he made orders to kill one million people? Why not community service, or a fi ne, or freedom? Th e challenge facing retribution is that it can be labelled as nothing more than revenge: an irrational and emotional display of hurt feelings through the infl iction of violence upon the off ender. Other retributivist writers believe it is about justice and re-payment:
"… punishment must be related to the gravity of the wrong because it must signify nothing but the recoiling of the criminal's own act against itself. To fi x penalties according to the requirements of deterrence or correction is to degrade him to an object or tool; were a fi ne the penalty for murder, we would feel that murder had not been suffi ciently repaid." 64 Th is is an interesting argument, but how are crimes against humanity 'repaid'? Let us assume that Hitler was captured after the Second World War. Could we have simply taken all his luxuries and power away from him in order to punish him, or could we have allowed the surviving relatives of the genocide victims to kill him and each take a piece of his body to replace their missing relative in order to 'repay' his crime? What is the unit of measurement?
McCloskey was part of the retributivist revival in the 1960's. His views on retributivism are very illustrative of some the challenges facing the desert theory:
"Punishment, to be justly administered, must involve care in determining whether the off ending person is really a responsible agent . Th e punishment must not exceed what is appropriate to the crime. A general principle of justice [is] that equals should be treated equally and unequal's unequally . Unequal treatment amounts to deliberate infl iction of evils : suff ering or death. Production of the greatest good is obviously a relevant consideration when determining which punishment may properly be infl icted, but the question as to which punishment is just is a much more basic and important consideration. Th e fact that we reach diff erent conclusions about the relative gravity of diff erent crimes constitutes no diffi culty for the retributive theory. Most of us would agree that murder is a very serious crime and that shoplifting a cake of soap is a considerably lesser off ence."
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McCloskey makes some interesting -if not rather ambiguous -arguments about justice. He states that 'unequals' must be treated 'unequally' and this would lead to justice. What makes an off ender 'unequal'? Are there varying degrees of unequalness? How is this measured? Some off ences present simple solutions for retributivists: a rapist could be raped, a murderer could be shot, etc. But if a murderer kills one person and receives the 'just' penalty of death, what would a leader who kills many people receive? Th e same sentence? Would he receive an additional torturing? Does this not make his punishment unequal to his crime?
When it comes to punishment, retributivists can not provide a clear answer to the question of measurement. Indistinctly, McCloskey states that if we all agree that murder is wrong, we can therefore adequately measure which punishments match other off ences. In practice, we see this in our court systems today. Parking off ences are met with fi nes, murders are met with mandatory life sentences. But judges are allowed to take into account defenses and personal circumstances. Retribution allows for no such thing. If Saddam Hussein was clinically insane and committed genocide in a cloud of confusion, would he have still been hanged?
McCloskey states that 'unequal treatment amounts to deliberate infl iction of evils'. Why does unequal treatment automatically equate to suff ering or death? What if the off ence was non-violent, such as adultery? Or an off ence with no victim, such as money laundering? Brudner adds a welcome theory of proportionality to retributivism, but he also removes the consideration of mens rea when punishing. Th is is controversial -moving away from the retributivist view of culpability -and may make a considerable diff erence to the proportion of punishment infl icted:
"Th e commensurability of crimes and punishments would be destroyed as soon as we added considerations of mens rea to the balance. Th e measure of punishment is properly derived not from the qualitative or quantitative aspects of the crime (as in revenge) but from its moral signifi cance."
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Brudner prefers to look at the moral signifi cance of an off ence rather than the characteristics of the defendant and the circumstances surrounding the crime. Could this be applied eff ectively to genocide? Would it have mattered to the Kurdish survivors whether Saddam Hussein was insane or not? Brudner's comments present one signifi cant discrepancy. By removing the consideration of mens rea when deciding punishment, the elements of wickedness and culpability are also removed from consideration. Th ese are the very elements that make an off ence 'morally wrong'. Let us say that an epileptic man begins to take a seizure in the street, and kicks a small child to within an inch of her life. He has no intent. He has no wickedness. How is this man's action morally wrong if he did not 'act' in the relevant sense? Let us now take a man who repeatedly kicks a small child with the intention to kill that child. He carries a vicious and dangerous intent which is dangerous to society. Th is man is more deserving of punishment. It is in society's moral interests to punish a dangerous man as opposed to an epileptic man. Brudner's version of retributivism does not take into account the intent or the rationale behind the defendant's actions, which may, in today's legal systems, equate to a defense. Th e only consideration upon which to decide what would amount to a 'just' punishment appears to be the resulting harm from the victim's point of view. Could this approach illustrate more clearly the 'moral signifi cance' of the off ence? If we were to punish off ences from the victim's point of view, the punishment could potentially be much more severe than that of an off ender who had an excuse or a defense taken into account (i.e. duress). Additionally, how would such punishments be measured and applied by the court system? Th e punishment of genocide -from the view of a retributivist such as Brudner -would certainly be death. Although this may seem 'just' in the eyes of the surviving relatives of the victims, there is a concern when applying the retributivist theory that by putting to death the off ender, without acknowledging the off ender's motives or state of mind, the state is as bad as the off ender himself. Is there a compromise?
Combined Th eories to Punish Genocide
Whilst retributivism is more appropriate to punish genocide than utilitarianism, one cannot help but feel that retributivism is merely a revenge tactic with no logic, no rational thought, and no deterrent message. Hart famously presented a compromise theory. 67 He believed that the general aim of punishment concerned general deterrence and social protection -the cornerstones of utilitarianism. However, when considering who may be punished, he limited the options, using the retributivist principle of fairness and distribution, to the culpable off ender, placing a heavy emphasis on the off ender's voluntary conduct and blameworthiness. 68 Th is theory appears, at fi rst glance, to fi t quite well to genocide. One of the main reasons behind the Nuremberg Trials was to send a message to future generations that such atrocities should never be allowed to happen again, yet it was also satisfying to know that Auschwitz Commandant Rudolf Hoess was hanged on the grounds of Auschwitz where he had killed so many innocent people. Is it possible that the combined theory suggested by Hart could apply to the punishment of genocide? On the one hand, we would punish to deter, but on the other hand, we would limit the pursuit of the utilitarian goal by only punishing the culpable individual. But what of leaders like Adolf Hitler and Saddam Hussein, who merely gave orders to kill as opposed to shooting or gassing civilians themselves? Were they less culpable under Hart's theory than the servants who carried out the commands?
Perhaps it is best to think of punishment as a combination of deterrence and defi ance when it comes to genocide. Th e message from the international community appears to be: "we will not tolerate such behaviour, and if it occurs, the culpable party will be called to account." 67) H.L.A. Hart , op. cit. f.n. 55, at pages 5-6. 68) Th is idea is similar to that of Rawls, who argued that the justifi cation for the institution of punishment was a utilitarian one, but within the institution, individual punishments were justifi ed on an essentially retributive basis. See J. Rawls 
Punishing a Moral Wrong: Sanctions
As a result of the mass killings in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990's, two International Criminal Tribunals were established by the UN Security Council under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Th e Statutes of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 69 and the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 70 have both provided for the prosecution of individuals accused of genocide despite their limited jurisdiction. Akayesu 71 was hailed by UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan as: genocides extradited to Rwanda for prosecution. Th is is interesting. Th e international community prefer not to allow perpetrators to be extradited to a State which uses the death penalty and torture, despite the nature of the indictment. Is the international community showing a new sense of maturity, or are they leaving behind a more retributivist view? In Kayishema and Ruzindana the ICTR Appeals Chamber remarked that all of the crimes under the ICTR Statute are serious violations of international humanitarian law capable of attracting the same sentence, and genocide -as the 'crime of crimes' -does not impact on the sentence imposed. 77 Th is is disappointing. Akhavan fi nds this diffi cult to accept, submitting that it is inappropriate to apply a 'general appreciation' to 'the pinnacle of evil'.
78 Even Lemkin saw the evil of genocide as an aggravating factor for punishment:
"… criminal intent to kill or destroy all the members of such a group shows premeditation and deliberation and a state of systematic criminality which is only an aggravated circumstance for punishment."
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In real terms, is the international community sending out a message to leaders that genocide is no longer as morally culpable as it once was? Several signatories to the 1951 Convention -namely Bahrain, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, the United States, Vietnam, Yemen, and Yugoslaviasigned with the proviso that no claim of genocide could be brought against them at the International Court of Justice without their consent. Th is caused considerable controversy. Perhaps the notion of jus cogens is not so far-reaching after all? It seems unlikely in the future that the international community will suddenly become 'tougher' on genocide; every day the horrors of the holocaust become more distant in our memory. Th ere does not seem to be the same urgency -the same conviction -to punish this 'crime of crimes' as there used to be.
If one looks closely, criminal proceedings are still happening. Genocide is unlikely to stay out of the news in the foreseeable future, and this is evidence that the Genocide Convention is still having an impact. Radovan Karadzic is now awaiting trial for his part in the Bosnian genocide, and on July 14, 2008, prosecutors at the International Criminal Court (ICC) fi led ten charges of war crimes against Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir in relation to the Sudan genocide. Th ese developments are positive; it sends a message to the international community that individuals will still be called upon to defend their genocidal behaviour in front of a judge and jury, no matter how highly-regarded they are. 80) www.genocidewatch.org
Conclusion
In 1996, Gregory Stanton , the president of Genocide Watch, 80 presented a briefi ng paper called 'Th e 8 Stages of Genocide' to the United States Department of State. In it, he identifi ed eight stages of behaviour characteristic of leaders who set out to exterminate a group of people. 1) Classifi cation: people are divided into 'us and them'; 2) Symbolization: symbols can be combined with hatred and forced upon a group i.e. hate speech; 3) Dehumanisation: one group denies the humanity of the other group and members of it are equated with animals and vermin; 4) Organisation: special units of armies or militia are trained and armed; 5) Polarisation: hate groups broadcast polarising propaganda; 6) Preparation: victims are identifi ed and separated out because of their ethnic or religious identity; 7) Extermination: it is 'extermination' to the killers because they do not believe their victims to be human; 8) Denial: the perpetrators deny they committed any crime. Can it be argued that genocide may only be identifi able when the physical eff ects of the crime (i.e. missing groups of people) begin to show? Th ere have been times, particularly as a result of the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR, where the response to genocide has been re-active rather than pro-active. By the time targeted ethnic or religious groups are separated, or broadcasts appear from hategroups, or armies are trained and equipped, the intent to commit genocide on the part of the perpetrator has probably been rooted, manifesting, and practiced in private for some time. In May 2008, President Robert Mugabe was faced with worldwide criticism when it emerged that the members of his Zanu-PF party tortured and killed civilians because they wanted to bring to an end their economic crisis and supported the opposition party. No State took action despite the strong evidence fi ltering out of the country through the international press. Whilst Gregory Stanton's work does ring true -victims of genocide are visibly persecuted before extermination begins -the international community clearly will not take action until the bitter end. Additionally, political groups are not part of the 1951 Convention. Is President Robert Mugabe 'free to go'?
Most people saw the trial of Saddam Hussein and his defi ance against the judge and the Court which tried him. Did it feel as though he was being punished for the deaths of many? On the face of it, he received the same treatment, the same trial, and the same penalty as what the next man would have received for the death of one victim. It may be diffi cult for retributivists, and the surviving families of genocide victims, to accept that we can not off er a greater punishment for the crime of genocide than we can for the killing of one man. Th is was refl ected most recently in Rwanda when the trials for the Tutsi and Hutu genocide off enders fi nally began because Rwanda outlawed the death penalty. However, the 506   507  508  509  510  511  512  513  514  515  516  517  518  519  520  521  522  523  524  525  526  527  528  529  530  531  532  533  534  535  536  537  538  539  540  541 
